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Abstract We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some
goods can be reduced by making commitments that reduce °exibility. We
show that such consumption commitments can induce consumers with risk-
neutral underlying utility functions to be risk averse over small variations in
income, but sometimes to seek risk over large variations. As a result, optimal
employment contracts will smooth wages conditional on being employed, but
may incorporate a possibility of unemployment.
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Suppose a young worker, contemplating future home ownership, marriage
and children, faces a choice between two ¯rms. One ¯rm never lays o® em-
ployees; it responds to adverse economic shocks by reducing the pay of all
workers. In contrast, the other ¯rm lays o® the most recently hired workers
while maintaining the wages of those workers retained. Concerned that a
wage reduction at the ¯rst ¯rm may force him to scrimp painfully on discre-
tionary expenditures in order to pay the mortgage and feed his family, the
worker may prefer the second ¯rm, while holding o® on buying a house and
starting a family until he has acquired su±cient seniority to preclude layo®s.
The two ¯rms may give rise to the same amount of lifetime wage risk, but
the latter concentrates this risk in the early years of employment. Because
the worker can coordinate his decisions about marriage and mortgages with
his (in)vulnerability to income shocks, he may prefer the ¯rm with layo®s
and concentrated risk.
Many goods are like housing in this example: they can be consumed more
cheaply if one makes commitments that give rise to rigidities in consumption.
Owning a house is cheaper (per unit of service) than renting, which is in
turn cheaper than living in a hotel. At the same time, the rigidities induced
by such consumption commitments can exacerbate the e®ects of income
°uctuations. A negative income shock may force a homeowner to go hungry
in an attempt to make the payments, incur the costs of selling her house,
or default on the mortgage. A renter faces fewer transactions costs and no
capital loss, while the hotel guest need only downgrade to a budget motel.1
There is ample evidence that commitments a®ect consumption patterns.
Chetty and Szeidl [8] show that households respond to small income shocks
by leaving their housing consumption ¯xed and making relatively large re-
ductions in food expenditures, while responding to larger shocks with more
balanced reductions in each. Shore and Sinai [14] show that households vul-
nerable to moderate income shocks make moderate housing commitments,
coupled with precautionary savings that allow them to weather shocks with-
out sacri¯cing their commitments. Households facing more volatile incomes
1Analogous e®ects can arise even without explicit ¯nancial obligations. The expected
utility from a vacation home may be jeopardized by negative income shocks, even if there
are no further payments to make and the home itself is not at risk.
1make more aggressive commitments and save less, understanding that a
negative shock may force them to liquidate the commitment.
Worker-consumers who can make consumption commitments have an
incentive to coordinate consumption and labor market decisions, matching
those times when consumption would be especially vulnerable to income
°uctuations with times when income is relatively secure.2 This raises our
basic question: How do consumption commitments a®ect the optimal em-
ployment contracts o®ered by a ¯rm in a risky market?
In the absence of some market friction, the answer is straightforward.
Because consumption commitments give rise to e®ective risk aversion, the
¯rm will completely insure its workers, subjecting them to neither wage nor
employment risk. However, many people do face income risk|otherwise
Chetty and Szeidl [8] and Shore and Sinai [14] would have nothing to study|
especially risk due to employment shocks. How do consumption commit-
ments a®ect employment contracts in the presence of some friction that
precludes full insurance?
We show that if consumption commitments are su±ciently important
and su±ciently costly to reverse, optimal contracts will couple layo®s with
wages that are higher and less variable conditional on being employed than
they would be without layo®s. Workers who accept such a contract are
sometimes immune to layo® risk (e.g., when they have accumulated su±cient
seniority), but are also sometimes vulnerable, being laid o® if and only if
the ¯rm experiences a negative shock. Workers know whether they are
vulnerable to being laid o® before making their consumption choices, but
must make their consumption commitments (if any) before knowing whether
they will actually be laid o® (if vulnerable). A worker optimally makes few
(or in our simplest model, no) consumption commitments when there is
positive probability that she will be laid o®. In return for this layo® risk,
the worker receives higher and more secure wages that better accommodate
commitments when she is not at risk.
As we will see in Section 2.4, consumption commitments introduce a non-
concavity into the worker's utility function. Commitments are of relatively
little value at low income levels but are more valuable at higher incomes. The
ability to tailor consumption commitments to one's vulnerability to layo®s
combines with this nonconcavity to make the contract with layo®s attrac-
2Several papers make a similar point. Ellingsen and Holden [11] argue that workers
who purchase durable goods in expectation of high future wages will make large purchases
and then resist lower wages more than they would had their expectations been pessimistic
(and hence durable purchases smaller). Ellingsen and Holden [12] analyze a model in
which worker indebtedness worsens their bargaining position vis a vis employers.
2tive. Eliminating the layo® risk would allow the worker to make better use
of consumption commitments in those circumstances when she would oth-
erwise have been vulnerable to layo®s, but comes at the cost of lower wages
and greater wage °uctuation when not vulnerable. When consumption com-
mitments are su±ciently important, the commitment-magni¯ed value of in-
creased wages when employment is secure overwhelms the (less burdensome,
with few commitments) prospect of a layo®, and the optimal balance fea-
tures employment risk. Our analysis thus points to a potentially important
factor in understanding the coexistence of wage rigidities and employment
risk.
Section 2 introduces a model of consumption commitments and employ-
ment contracts. Section 3 establishes conditions under which wage smooth-
ing and layo®s are optimal in a simple model, while Section 4 extends the
argument to an intertemporal model. Section 5 discusses the results.
2 Consumption Commitments
2.1 The Firm
We consider a ¯rm whose pro¯ts are a function of the quantity of worker-
consumers N 2 < that it hires and the realization of a state. Revenue in
state 2 (the bad state) is given by the function f : < ! <+, and in state 1
(the good state) by ®f, ® > 1. The good state occurs with probability p.
We assume that f is twice continuously di®erentiable on <+, with f0 > 0,




is bounded below by µ¤ > 0. This is the case, for example, for any power
function satisfying our assumptions. It is important to our analysis that the
marginal product of labor is decreasing in employment. Should complemen-
tarities reverse this relationship, our argument would no longer apply.
An employment contract includes the wage rate wi to be paid in each
state i 2 f1;2g, a quantity n2 of workers to be \kept on" in the bad state,
and a quantity n1 of workers who are employed only in the good state.3 The
3We assume that all employed workers receive the same payment. This simpli¯es the
calculations, but does not play an important role in the results. It is straightforward to
show that if the ¯rm is to lay o® workers, it will do so in the bad state, a result already
embedded in our speci¯cation of n1 and n2.
3¯rm's expected payo® is given by
p(®f(n1 + n2) ¡ w1(n1 + n2)) + (1 ¡ p)(f(n2) ¡ w2n2):
The ¯rm maximizes this payo® subject to the constraint that the employ-
ment contract provides workers with at least their reservation utility. The
employment contract must also specify how the workers (if any) to be laid o®
in the bad state will be selected, a feature that a®ects the expected payo®s
of workers but has no e®ect on the the ¯rm's payo®. We consider this as-
pect of an employment contract in Section 3 when examining the interaction
between the ¯rm and worker optimization problems.
2.2 Restrictions on Employment Contracts
Some limitation on the wages the ¯rm can pay to workers is critical to our
analysis. In the absence of such limitations, the \wage bill" argument of
Akerlof and Miyazaki [1] ensures that the optimal labor contract completely
insures the worker against risk, featuring no wage °uctuations and no un-
employment. Hence, a ¯rm that could perfectly insure workers would do
so, leaving us with a model incapable of studying wage or employment risk.
Our interest is in how optimal contracts balance wage and unemployment
risk in the presence of some friction that precludes perfect insurance.
We build such friction into our model in a particularly simple way|the
¯rm cannot pay a wage wi in state i 2 f1;2g that exceeds the marginal
product of labor in state i. Our primary interpretation of this constraint is
in terms of moral hazard. Payments in excess of marginal products would
tempt a ¯rm to ¯re workers for alleged nonperformance. If it is su±ciently
costly to verify performance, contracts with wages in excess of marginal
products cannot be sustained. We also assume that the ¯rm cannot make
payments to unemployed workers. This assumption is standard in the lit-
erature on implicit contracts (beginning with Azariadis [3], Baily [4], and
Gordon [13]). Again, if the ¯rm was committed to payments to laid-o®
workers, the ¯rm would be tempted to simply ¯re workers rather than lay
them o®.
A wide variety of other frictions would also give rise to our results.4 Our
argument holds as long as wages have the property that in a full employment
contract, wages in the bad state fall short of wages in the good state (see
4An absolute prohibition on wage rates in excess of marginal products and payments
to laid o® workers is clearly unrealistic. We view these stark assumptions as tractable
approximations of realistic market frictions, imposing limits on the extent to which wages
can exceed marginal products and ¯rms can maintain the incomes of laid-o® workers.
4note 9 for a quali¯cation), and that reducing bad-state employment allows
the ¯rm to maintain a higher wage than would be the case if all workers
were retained. The former is a feature of any friction giving rise to the
income risk that motivates our work, while a consistent theme in Bewley
[5] is that layo®s allow the ¯rm to avoid or attenuate wage reductions. We
do not claim that moral hazard considerations are the only force at work.
For example, limits on bad-state wages may re°ect ¯nancial constraints that
preclude sustained payments in excess of productivity. However, we must
include some constraint on wages, and ¯nd moral hazard considerations
particularly convenient.
2.3 Worker-Consumers
The worker-consumer (also called either simply a worker or consumer) has a
reservation utility, interpreted as the value of alternative market activities,
that we denote by U > 0. The consumer's utility depends on two things:
consumption of a good x and consumption of services that can be obtained
from either of two other goods, y or z. The consumer has a constant-
elasticity-of-substitution utility function over x and (y + z), the level of
services she receives from the goods y and z, given by
(°x½ + (1 ¡ °)(y + z)½)
1
½ : (1)
The constant-elasticity-of-substitution form for this utility function is not
essential to our results, but has the important advantage of allowing us to
talk precisely (by varying °) about the relative importance of the various
consumption goods.
The consumer is risk neutral, in the sense that her utility is linear along
rays through the origin in the space of feasible consumption bundles:
(°(¸x)½ + (1 ¡ °)(¸y + ¸z)½)
1
½ = ¸(°x½ + (1 ¡ °)(y + z)½)
1
½ :
The goods y and z are perfect substitutes representing di®erent ways that the
consumer can satisfy her desire for services. We assume that the consumer
can purchase either y or z, but not both: she must choose one of the two
ways to get the relevant services.5
5For example, y and z may represent purchased housing and rental housing, which may
be good substitutes but which are not easily combined into a single place of residence. We
could work with weaker versions of this assumption, with some additional complication, as
long as consumption commitments introduce su±cient rigidities in ex post consumption.
5Purchasing good y involves a nontrivial commitment, while there is no
commitment involved in purchasing z. We model this by assuming that
there is an ex ante market (before the state is realized) and an ex post
market (after the state has been realized). Commitments to good y must be
made in the ex ante market, while trade in z occurs in the ex post market.
Committing to good y (in the ex ante market) entails a ¯xed cost plus
a marginal cost. We normalize prices so that the price of x is one and
we normalize units of z and y so that the price of z is one. The cost of
committing to good y in the ex ante market is then
h(y) =
(
¯ + ·y if y > 0
0 if y = 0;
where 0 < · < 1 and ¯ > 0. Hence, the consumer can purchase the services
provided by goods y or z at a cheaper per unit price if she pays the ¯xed cost
of ¯ and purchases in the ex ante market. The nonlinear form of the price
of y is meant to capture the idea that securing services via good y is cost
e®ective only if consumption exceeds some minimum level. For example, it
is typically not ¯nancially attractive to purchase just a little bit of housing.
Ceteris paribus, there is an advantage to purchasing z rather than y, since
purchases in the ex post market can be conditioned on the realized state of
the world. This advantage must be weighed against the possible cost saving
allowed by commitments to good y.
The commitment to good y in the ex ante market, denoted by ^ y, can be
adjusted in the ex post market after the realization of the state is known,
but at a cost per unit di®erent from ·. Additional purchases of y can be
made at price ³ > 1, while portions of good y can be sold on the ex post
market, at price 1
Ã < ·. Purchases of y in the ex ante market thus come at
a lower marginal price than purchases of z, but adjustments to the level ^ y
are more expensive.6 We write the price relevant for such a reduction as 1
Ã
so that larger values of Ã and ³ correspond to more rigid commitments.
Let [»]+ = maxf»;0g and [»]¡ = minf»;0g. If a consumer has wage wi in










2 + (1 ¡ °)(y2 + z2)½)
1
½
6For example, buying a house with eight-foot ceilings and then increasing the ceiling
height to nine feet is more expensive than buying a house with higher ceilings in the ¯rst
place. Building a house with three bathrooms and then selling one is ¯nancially worse
than simply not having installed three.
6subject to the budget constraints (for i = 1;2)
xi + zi + h(^ y) + ³[yi ¡ ^ y]+ +
1
Ã
[yi ¡ ^ y]¡ = wi; (2)
and the constraints that the services be purchased via one or the other of y
and z, but not both:
^ yz1 = ^ yz2 = 0: (3)
Suppose the consumer may be laid o® with probability q > 0 in state 2.
A layo® consigns the consumer to home production, the value of which is
normalized to 0 (which may re°ect unemployment payments made by the

























This last inequality is a \no bankruptcy" constraint, capturing a require-
ment that a consumer who is laid o® must still be able to earn enough (by
liquidating the commitment good ^ y) to meet her ¯xed payment obligations
for the good. Since 1
Ã < ·, this requires a consumer facing layo® risk to
set ^ y = 0 in order to respect the budget constraint in state 2: In other
words, consumers at risk of being laid o® cannot make commitments. This
is no longer the case in Section 4, where a consumer might borrow or save to
cover the ¯xed cost of a commitment. This feature of the static model makes
layo®s more costly to workers and thus introduces a bias against layo®s.
Because of the no bankruptcy constraint, no individual enters the ex post
market having both made a consumption commitment and facing a risk of
being laid o®. However, consumers face a trade-o® between employment risk
and the extent to which they can make consumption commitments at the
initial stage at which they evaluate the expected utility of a labor contract.
Optimal employment contracts are shaped by this initial trade-o®, where
consumers may ¯nd it optimal to accept layo® risk, knowing that this reduces
the circumstances in which they can make commitments, in return for more
e®ective commitments when they can make them.
72.4 Commitments and Utility
To gain insight into the consumer's utility maximization problem, we ab-
stract from layo® concerns, ¯x a commitment level ^ y > 0; and consider the
ex post problem of choosing x and y to




x + ·^ y + ³[y ¡ ^ y]+ +
1
Ã
[y ¡ ^ y]¡ = I;
where I is ex post net income (i.e., realized income minus the ¯xed commit-
ment cost, or wi ¡ ¯). Studying this ex post problem provides insight into
why risk-neutral consumers may, ex ante, seek employment risk in exchange
for higher wages and lower wage °uctuations when employed.
First, suppose (hypothetically) that the consumer could buy and sell
good y at price ³. Figure 1 shows the resulting expansion path, identifying
optimal (x;y) bundles for various income levels. This path consists of points
such as B, where the consumer's indi®erence curves are tangent to a budget
constraint of the form I0 = x+³y. Alternatively, suppose the consumer could
buy and sell good y at either price · or price 1=Ã. Figure 1 again shows
the corresponding expansion paths, this time composed of points such as
A at which an indi®erence curve is tangent to a budget line of the form
I00 = x + ·y, or points such as C at which an indi®erence curve is tangent
to a budget line of the form I000 = x + 1
Ãy.
Now consider the consumer's ex post optimization given commitment to
a level of consumption ^ y, given that additional purchases of good y come
at price ³ while sales come at price 1=Ã. Suppose ex post income I is such
that setting y = ^ y and spending the remaining income on x yields a point
such as A in Figure 1, where the indi®erence curve is tangent to the budget
line I = x + ·^ y. This bundle is optimal ex ante, given price ·. Ex post,
the consumer faces the kinked budget constraint shown in Figure 2 (the
dashed lines), since the consumer buys y at the price ³ > · and sells at
price 1=Ã < ·, and hence A remains optimal.
Suppose the consumer has chosen commitment ^ y but receives a higher ex
post income than that required to purchase bundle A. This higher income
would induce increased purchases of y if they could be made at price ·, but
small increases in income will not induce additional purchases at the higher
price ³, with the consumer instead spending any additional income on good
8x
y
path expansion - z
path expansion - y








path expansion - k
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Figure 1: Hypothetical expansion paths in the ex post market, identifying
loci of optimal (x;y) pairs as ex post income I varies from 0 to an arbitrarily
large level. The ³-expansion path would be relevant if the price of y were ³
and hence the budget constraint were I0 = x + ³y. The ·-expansion path
would be relevant for price · and budget constraint I00 = x + ·y, and the
Ã-expansion path for price 1=Ã and budget constraint I000 = x + 1
Ãy.
x.7 This continues until income is su±ciently large to induce consumption
bundle B in Figure 2, where the consumer's indi®erence curve is tangent
to a budget line with slope ³. Thereafter, increases in income prompt the
consumer to make adjustments in both goods x and y, expanding along
the ³-expansion path. Analogously, decreases in income ¯rst induce the
consumer to reduce only the consumption of good x, until reaching a point
such as C in Figure 2, where the indi®erence curve is tangent to a budget
line of slope 1=Ã. Further reductions in income prompt reductions in both
x and y, with consumption contracting along the Ã-expansion path.
Figure 3 shows the indirect utility function, denoted by ~ U, giving the
consumer's (optimal) utility as a function of ex post gross income I (i.e., in-
come before incurring the ¯xed cost ¯), presuming a commitment ^ y. The ray
7This is the counterpart of Chetty and Szeidl's [8] ¯nding that small income shocks
produce no adjustment in housing but large adjustments in food consumption.
9x
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Figure 2: Ex post expansion path (in bold), given commitment ^ y. Small
variations in ex post income (around the level for which ^ y is ex ante optimal)
prompt changes in x but leave y ¯xed at ^ y, giving the vertical portion of
the expansion path connecting points B and C. Once income is su±ciently
large as to induce consumption bundle B, de¯ned by the tangency of the
consumer's indi®erence curve with a budget line whose slope is given by
the price ³ at which the consumer can purchase y in the ex post market,
further increases in income induce increases in both x and y, proceeding
along the ³-expansion path. Similarly, once consumption drops to the level
consistent with point C, further reductions move the consumer inward along
the Ã-expansion path.
marked · would be the indirect utility function if the consumer purchased
services via good y at price ·. This path is linear, since the consumer is
risk neutral if allowed to vary x and y freely at prices 1 and ·, but does
not pass through the origin, re°ecting the ¯xed cost ¯. For a given commit-
ment ^ y, there is an income level I(^ y) at which the consumer's unconstrained
optimal purchase of good y (at price ·, given ¯xed cost ¯) will equal ^ y,
yielding point A in Figure 3 (corresponding to point A in Figures 1 and
2). Realized incomes above this level initially induce increases in the con-
sumption of good x; but leave y unchanged at ^ y, until reaching point B in
Figure 3 (and Figures 1 and 2). At this point, the consumer supplements
10U ~
I









Figure 3: Indirect utility function, labelled ~ U, giving utility as a function of
ex post gross income I, for commitment ^ y. The indirect utility function is
concave for incomes above ¯ but fails to be concave when incomes [0;¯] are
also considered.
the commitment ^ y by purchasing additional quantities of good y at price ³
(as well as additional quantities of good x). The indirect utility function is
then again linear, with a °atter slope representing the higher (than ·) price
³.8 Similarly, reductions in income below I(^ y) initially prompt no reduction
in good y, until point C is reached, after which some units of good y are
sold at price 1
Ã and the indirect utility function is again linear.
The indirect utility function is strictly concave in a neighborhood of I(^ y).
Having made a commitment ^ y, the consumer is risk averse over small varia-
tions in income, as the cost of adjusting y channels any variation into good
8The indirect utility function is di®erentiable at point B. The extension of this linear
segment emanating from point B passes above point A. This segment is part of a linear
indirect utility function that would be relevant if the consumer faced prices (1;³) for goods
(x;y), with an ex post income subsidized by (³ ¡ ·)^ y, so that the ¯rst ^ y units of good y
can be purchased at price ·, but with no restrictions on purchases of good y. At ex post
income I(^ y), the consumer can then buy the bundle that gives the utility corresponding
to point A, but optimally chooses to purchase less y and more x (given prices (1;³)), for
a higher utility.
11x. However, the indirect utility function is not globally concave, introducing
the possibility of risk-seeking behavior over large variations in income. In
particular, a mixture of zero utility (being laid o®) and the utility corre-
sponding to any point near A is preferred to the utility of the corresponding
expected income. The potential attractiveness of such mixtures gives rise to
the optimality of employment contracts with layo®s|the ¯rm lays o® work-
ers in the bad state, relaxing the marginal product constraint in that state
and thereby increasing and smoothing wages for workers when employed.
3 Optimal Layo®s
This section examines optimal employment contracts in a single-period model.
This model is designed to retain the °avor of a dynamic model while allow-
ing us to identify the key features of optimal employment contracts with a
minimum of clutter. Section 4 extends the analysis to a dynamic model.
3.1 Timing
Events proceed in the following sequence:
1. The ¯rm o®ers an employment contract (w1;n2;w2;n2). Workers ac-
cept or reject. The optimal contract will provide an expected utility
equal to the alternative U, and workers will choose to accept.
2. Each worker draws an \age": young with probability n1=(n1 + n2)
and old with probability n2=(n1 + n2). Young workers are vulnera-
ble to layo®s, that is, they will be laid o® in the bad state. This
is meant to capture in our static model the features of a dynamic
model. In the dynamic model, layo® eligibility will be determined by
age. Workers signing a contract know they will be at risk of layo® at
some ages (in which case they will make small but not necessarily zero
commitments), and that they will be immune from layo®s at other
ages (allowing greater use of commitments). In the static model, each
worker signing a contract knows that she will be vulnerable to layo®
under some age draws (in which case she will make zero commitments)
and not vulnerable in others (allowing commitments).
3. Workers make consumption commitments (i.e., choose ^ y > 0) in the
ex ante market or choose not to do so (^ y = 0).
124. The state is realized. As is standard in the implicit contracts litera-
ture, workers cannot change employers at this point. All workers are
retained in state 1, while vulnerable workers are laid o® in state 2.
5. Workers who remain employed collect their wage, choose x and ei-
ther z (in the absence of a commitment) or y (with a commitment).
Employed workers consume the resulting bundle while laid-o® workers
receive the utility of home production.
3.2 Optimal Contracts without Commitments
Our ¯rst result is that if the optimal contract does not induce consumption
commitments (i.e., all consumers set ^ y = 0), then the contract features no
layo®s and the wage equals the marginal product of labor in each state. The
consumer is risk neutral in this case, eliminating any advantage to paying
wages that are not equal to marginal products. This in turn removes any in-
centive for the ¯rm to lay o® workers in order to increase marginal products
and thus relax wage constraints. Any contract with layo®s is then domi-
nated by a full-employment contract with suitably adjusted wages. Lemma
1 couples this result with obvious su±cient conditions for commitments to
be suboptimal.
Lemma 1
(1.1) If the optimal employment contract does not induce commitments,
then there are no layo®s and ®f0 = w1 > w2 = f0.
(1.2) If either · > 1, ¯ is su±ciently large, or ° is su±ciently large,
then the optimal contract features no commitments.
Proof.
(1.1) Suppose that the optimal employment contract does not induce
commitments and features layo®s (i.e., n1 > 0). If w1 = ®f0(n1 + n2),
then a marginal reduction in n1 has no e®ect on the ¯rm's payo® while in-
creasing consumer utility (by decreasing the layo® probability), introducing
slack into the consumer's participation constraint that the ¯rm can exploit
to increase its payo®. If w1 < ®f0(n1 + n2), then the ¯rm can decrease w2
and increase w1, while preserving expected payments to the consumer and
expected pro¯ts (and hence expected utility, here exploiting the consumer's
risk neutrality in the absence of commitments), until w1 = ®f0(n1 + n2);
at which point n1 can again be pro¯tably reduced. If there are no layo®s
13and the expected wage falls short of the expected marginal product in ei-
ther state, then the ¯rm can pro¯tably increase its employment. Section 6
provides the details of this argument.
(1.2) If · > 1, then the cost of buying good 2 via commitments exceeds
the cost of making the same purchase on the spot market. Similarly, if
¯ is su±ciently large, the cost h(^ y) of buying the quantity ^ y via commit-
ments exceeds the cost of purchasing that amount on the spot market for a
su±ciently large interval [0; ^ y¤] that the consumer makes no commitments.
Fixing ¯ > 0 and ·, if ° is su±ciently large, then the optimal consump-
tion of good y is su±ciently small that the ¯xed cost ¯ is prohibitive, again
ensuring that no commitments are made.
3.3 Optimal Contracts with \Flexible Commitments"
If commitments induce no ex post rigidities, we will again have full employ-
ment contracts with wages equal to marginal products. Speci¯cally, if we
relax our maintained assumption and let ³ = 1
Ã = · < 1, so that the level of
y can be adjusted ex post without penalty, and if ¯ is su±ciently small (to
ensure that commitments are optimal, though this does not require ¯ = 0),
then consumers will make commitments (i.e., will choose ^ y > 0), but the
optimal contract will again feature no layo®s and wages equal to marginal
products:
Lemma 2 If ³ = 1
Ã = · < 1 and ¯ is su±ciently small, then the optimal
employment contract induces ^ y > 0, but features no layo®s and ®f0 = w1 >
w2 = f0.
Proof. Let ³ = 1
Ã = · < 1 and let ¯ be small enough that ¯ + ·z¤
i < z¤
i ,
i = 1;2, where z¤
i is the optimal state-i consumption of good z when y is
unavailable. This ensures that the optimal contract induces the consumer
to set ^ y > 0. Because the consumer is risk neutral ex post, the argument
proving Lemma 1.1 then ensures that there are no layo®s and ®f0 = w1 >
w2 = f0.
Hence, consumption commitments potentially a®ect optimal employment
contracts only because commitments make it more di±cult to adjust one's
consumption in response to employment shocks.
143.4 Optimal Contracts with Commitments
We now return to the ex post rigidities induced by consumption commit-
ments when 1
Ã < · < 1 < ³. The ¯rst step toward examining the potential
optimality of layo®s is to note that consumption commitments introduce risk
aversion over small variations in ex post income (seen in the concavity of
the indirect utility function in Figure 3 in a neighborhood of I(^ y)), causing
the ¯rm to optimally smooth wages:
Lemma 3 When ¯ and · are su±ciently small, consumers facing no layo®
risk make commitments. The optimal employment contract smooths wages,
in the sense that w2 = f0(n2) and w1 < ®f0(n1 + n2).
Proof. We provide an outline of the argument, leaving the details to Sec-
tion 6. It is immediate that commitments are optimal for su±ciently small
¯ and ·. Suppose w2 = f0 and w1 = ®f0. If there are layo®s, then a
marginal reduction in n1 while preserving n2 leaves the ¯rm's payo® unaf-
fected, while increasing consumer utility (by reducing the layo® probability),
introducing slack in the participation constraint that the ¯rm can exploit
to increase its payo®. In the absence of layo®s, we have w1 > w2, and a
marginal reduction in n2 (holding n1 = 0) again leaves the ¯rm's payo®
unchanged, while allowing wage smoothing. It is apparent from Figure 3,
along with the optimality of consumption commitments (implying that real-
ized incomes lie in the concave portion of the indirect utility function), that
this wage smoothing increases consumer utility.
In the good state, the wage falls short of the marginal product of labor
(w1 < ®f0(n1+n2)). If the ¯rm could freely hire workers in an ex post labor
market, it would do so until the wage no longer fell short of the marginal
product. There is no such equalizing force in the initial labor market. We
have assumed in constructing our model that there is no ex post market for
workers. This is again a stark but convenient abstraction, capturing the fact
that ¯rms and workers can increase the surplus they are to split by making
ex ante agreements, tying ¯rms and workers together and thereby limiting
the e®ectiveness of the ex post labor market.
Our basic result shows that if commitments are su±ciently valuable and
induce su±cient rigidity in the consumption of good y, optimal contracts
will feature layo®s. The following is a special case of Proposition 2 (obtained
by setting ± = 0 in Section 4), and we defer proof to the consideration of
Proposition 2.
15Proposition 1 For su±ciently small ¯ > 0, there exist ¹ ·(¯) > 0, ¹ °(¯) > 0;
¹ ³(¯) and ¹ Ã(¯) such that for all · < ¹ ·(¯); ° < ¹ °(¯), ³ > ¹ ³(¯) and Ã > ¹ Ã(¯),
the optimal contract features layo®s.
Layo®s have two advantages. First, a worker who has made consumption
commitments is ex post risk averse. A full employment contract with wages
equal to marginal products exposes the worker to risk. The ¯rm has an
incentive to o®er smoother wage rates, but is constrained in doing so by
the marginal product of labor in state 2.9 Layo®s relax this constraint by
reducing state-2 employment and hence increasing the marginal product.
Second, consumption commitments magnify the e®ectiveness of income in
generating utility. Even if the ¯rm has perfectly smoothed wages across
states (conditional on employment), the consumer may prefer to take on
additional employment risk in order to relax the bad-state marginal product
constraint on this wage and thus consume more of the commitment good
when employed. This is the observation that, in Figure 3, a mixture of zero
utility (being laid o®) and the utility corresponding to any point near A is
preferred to the utility of the corresponding expected income.
The conditions of the proposition ensure that commitments are optimal
(¯ and · small) and that the rigidities introduced by consumption com-
mitments are relatively severe (° small and ³ and Ã large), and hence the
concave portion of the indirect utility function in Figure 3 is quite concave,
making wage smoothing particularly valuable.10
Remark 1. As ³ and Ã get arbitrarily large, ex post adjustments in com-
mitments become impossible (the vertical portion of the expansion path
in Figure 2 gets arbitrarily large). As Proposition 1 indicates, layo®s are
especially likely to be optimal under these circumstances. The preference
of consumers to trade some layo® risk for smoother wages conditional on
being employed arises not only out of the costs they otherwise incur in mak-
ing ex post adjustments in their commitments (which are absent if no such
adjustments are made), but also out of the large °uctuations in noncommit-
9The ¯rm could perfectly smooth wages, without layo®s, by simply reducing the good-
state wage to equal the bad-state marginal product: w1 = w2 ¡ f
0(n). Then the average
wage falls short of the average marginal product, and the ¯rm would like to hire more
workers. It cannot do so and preserve w1 and w2 without pushing the bad-state mar-
ginal product below w2, violating the marginal product constraint. Layo®s again become
valuable as a way of relaxing this constraint.
10It is immediate from Lemma 2 that layo®s will not be optimal if commitments are
not su±ciently rigid.
16ment consumption they must otherwise endure to mitigate or avoid ex post
adjustments in commitments.
Remark 2. Layo®s are potentially optimal in our model because they re-
duce employment in the bad state, relaxing the marginal-product constraint
on wages. Could the ¯rm instead relax this constraint by retaining all of
its workers, but having each work fewer hours? Laying o® half the workers
or halving the time each works may leave the ¯rm with the same e®ective
workforce,11 but these have quite di®erent e®ects on the workers. When the
¯rm lays o® half its workforce, the remaining workers can be paid as much as
f0(1
2N), while if it retains all the workers but cuts their hours by half, each
worker can be paid at most half as much, or 1
2f0(1
2N), a disadvantage for a
policy designed to boost state-2 worker incomes. More generally, retaining
all workers but having each work ¸ < 1 times full employment would allow
the ¯rm to pay up to ¸f0(¸N) per worker. If the elasticity of the production
function ¡
f00(N)N
f0(N) is below 1, as is the case if f is a power function, reducing
hours would force a reduction in payments to workers, exacerbating rather
than smoothing ex post payment variations and ensuring that hours reduc-
tions would never be part of an optimal contract, even when layo®s could
be.12
Remark 3. Layo®s relax a constraint on the wage the ¯rm can pay. A
more e®ective response would be income °uctuation insurance, o®ered ei-
ther by the ¯rm or by a third party, that severs the link between the wage
o®ered by the ¯rm and the payment received by the worker. Our model
excludes such insurance and our results will not hold in its presence. We
suspect that moral hazard considerations preclude third-party income °uc-
tuation insurance|there is less incentive to actually work once one's in-
come is insured|and preclude the ¯rm's fully insuring workers when laid
o® (though we have not modelled such factors). Our model incorporates an
explicit constraint on the ¯rm's ability to insure against income °uctuations
while employed, in the form of a prohibition on wages in excess of marginal
products.
11We ignore here the possibility that output might depend not only on the number of
man-hours available, but also the number of workers.
12If the elasticity exceeds 1, reducing hours will allow an increase in state-2 payments,
though this increase will not be as large as that allowed by layo®s. Of course, reducing
hours rather than laying o® workers has the advantage of eliminating the possibility of
zero wage.
174 An Intertemporal Model
In the one-period model of the previous section, a consumer at risk of being
laid o® cannot make consumption commitments, for fear of being unable
to cover the ¯xed cost. In practice, a consumer can draw on past savings
or borrow against future income to sustain commitments, permitting some
commitments even when facing layo® risk. This introduces a feature mak-
ing layo®s more attractive. At the same time, saving and borrowing allows
consumers to smooth wages conditional on employment, attenuating one
bene¯t of layo® contracts. In this section, we extend the analysis to an in-
tertemporal setting that allows saving and borrowing, and again investigate
the optimality of layo®s.
4.1 The Firm
The ¯rm is in¯nitely lived. Workers are potentially employed for two peri-
ods. The ¯rm signs a contract with a young worker at the beginning of the
worker's tenure with the ¯rm, specifying the wage as a function of the state
in each period of employment.
We examine a steady state. In any period, the ¯rm contracts with N
workers, employing n2 workers in the bad state and N = n1 + n2 in the
good state, where n1 may be zero. We assume that in each period the ¯rm
has an equal number of young and old workers. At the beginning of each
period the ¯rm hires a set of young workers to replace the old workers of the
previous period. The ¯rm can condition a worker's wage on the state, but
not the worker's age or the previous-period state. Relaxing this assumption
complicates the details of the analysis but does not vitiate the result. The
result of this steady state analysis is that the ¯rm's pro¯t maximization
problem is very similar to the one it faces in the single-period model of the
previous section.
4.2 Worker-Consumers
Each worker-consumer lives for two periods. Let ^ y(j) be the consumer's
commitment in period j and hj(^ y(j)) be the corresponding cost, where
h1(^ y(1)) =
(
¯ + ·^ y(1) if ^ y(1) > 0
0 if ^ y(1) = 0
h2(^ y(2)) =
(
¯ + ·^ y(2) if ^ y(2) > 0
0 if ^ y(2) = 0:
18The consumer thus faces no constraints on the ability to adjust the level
of the commitment good between periods. Given enough time, people can
adjust their consumption of housing services not by incremental changes to
their current house, but by moving to a new one.13 As in the one-period
model, the presence of the ¯xed cost ¯ in the second period captures the
fact that once again the commitment is drawn from a technology in which
there is a premium on a su±ciently large scale of services.
If the consumer chooses a given level ^ y in each period, then ¯ + ·^ y is
paid in each period. One might view the cost of purchased housing as more
heavily weighted toward the beginning. We can readily interpret the model
as one in which commitment ^ y is made in the initial period at cost (1+±)(¯+
·^ y). Nothing further need be paid if ^ y is maintained in the second period,
while otherwise the value of the remaining service °ow (±(¯ +·^ y)) must be
sold and a new commitment made at cost h(^ y) (again, with a transaction
cost easily accommodated). Since we have incorporated no capital market
imperfections into our model, this is equivalent to the current formulation.
The consumer's utility maximization problem is now
max
xi(j);^ y(j);yi(j);zi(j);i;j2f1;2g
p(°x1(1)½ + (1 ¡ °)(y1(1) + z1(1))½)
1
½ + (1 ¡ p)(°x2(1)½ + (1 ¡ °)(y2(1) + z2(1))½)
1
½
+±[p(°x1(2)½ + (1 ¡ °)(y1(2) + z1(2))½)
1
½ + (1 ¡ p)(°x2(2)½ + (1 ¡ °)(y2(2) + z2(2))½)
1
½]
where xi(j), for example, is the quantity of good x consumed in period j in
state i, subject to
zi(j)^ y(j) = 0; i;j = 1;2;
and, for each combination of state i(1) and i(2) in periods 1 and 2,
xi(1)(1) + zi(1)(1) + h1(^ y(1)) + ³[yi(1)(1) ¡ ^ y(1)]+
+ ±
³
xi(2)(2) + zi(2)(2) + h2(^ y(2)) + ³[yi(2)(2) ¡ ^ y(2)]+
´
· wi(1)(1) + ±wi(2)(2) ¡
1
Ã
[yi(1)(1) ¡ ^ y(1)]¡ ¡ ±
1
Ã
[yi(2)(2) ¡ ^ y(2)]¡;
where wi(j) is the wage paid in period state i and period j.
As before there are no restrictions on the consumer's ability to tailor x
to the period and state. At the beginning of the contract, before learning
the ¯rst-period state, the consumer has an opportunity to satisfy her service
13There may be transaction costs associated with such a move, and other commitment
goods such as children may give rise to prohibitive adjustment costs. Adding such costs
to the model will only reinforce the rigidities induced by consumption commitments and
hence our results.
19requirement via commitment, that is to choose a positive level ^ y(1) at cost
h1(^ y1). The consumer can buy additional units of y in the ex post market,
but must do so at price ³. The consumer can reduce consumption of good
y below ^ y(1), but in the course of doing so can recover only the fraction
1
Ã(^ y(1) ¡ y(1)) of the cost. This sequence is repeated in the second period,
beginning with a new commitment ^ y2 made at cost h2(^ y2).
Notice that consumers at risk of being laid o® are no longer automatically
precluded from making commitments. A consumer facing a layo® risk in
(only) the ¯rst period can borrow from second-period income to cover a
¯rst-period commitment should the bad state occur in the ¯rst period.
4.3 Timing
Events in each period proceed in the following sequence:
1. The ¯rm o®ers an employment contract (w1;n1;w2;n2). Young work-
ers reject or (in equilibrium) accept.
2. If n1=(n1 + n2) < 1=2, each young worker draws an \age"{as before,
young or old|that makes the worker vulnerable to layo® with proba-
bility 2n1=(n1+n2) and otherwise not vulnerable. \Second generation"
workers are not subject to layo® risk. If n1=(n + 1 + n2) > 1=2, each
¯rst generation worker is vulnerable to layo®, and each second gener-
ation worker takes a draw that makes the worker vulnerable to layo®
with probability 2(n1=(n1 + n2) ¡ 1=2) and otherwise not vulnerable.
3. Workers make consumption commitments (i.e., choose ^ y > 0) in the
\ex ante" market or choose not to do so (^ y = 0).
4. The state is realized. All workers are retained in state 1, while vulner-
able workers are laid o® in state 2.
5. Workers who remain employed collect their wage, choose x and ei-
ther z (in the absence of a commitment) or y (with a commitment).
Employed workers consume the resulting bundle while laid-o® workers
receive the utility of home production.
We have assumed that layo® priority is based on age, with younger
workers being vulnerable to layo®s. However, if the contract calls for only
a fraction of the workers of a given age to be laid o®, we still require the
\age draws" of the static model to ¯x priority. If we measured age more
¯nely and modeled workers as being employed by the ¯rm for su±ciently
20many periods, these \age draws" would be unnecessary. As long as the age
draws are made before consumers make their consumption commitments,
these formulations are equivalent.
Proposition 2 (below) establishes conditions under which a contract with
age-based layo®s dominates a full employment contract. This su±ces to
make our point, since if an optimal contract under our seniority restriction
features layo®s, so must an optimal contract without this restriction. How-
ever, it leaves open the question of whether seniority is an optimal way to
prioritize layo®s. Determining the optimal layo® priority requires a richer
model, including (among other things) job-speci¯c capital accumulation and
imperfect capital markets.
4.4 Equilibrium
Consider ¯rst a consumer facing an employment contract with no layo®s.
Commitments will be optimal if ¯ and · are su±ciently small. Given our
steady-state assumption, we will have w2(1) = w2(2) = f0(n2). If the opti-
mal contract features no variation at all in the consumer's income, so that
w1(j) = w2(j), then the consumer would set ^ y(1) = ^ y(2) and make no trans-
fers between periods. In general, it will be optimal for the ¯rm to smooth
the consumer's income by setting w1(j) < ®f0(n1 + n2), but not to smooth
income perfectly. In this case, a consumer who encounters the bad state
in the ¯rst period will transfer income from the second period to the ¯rst,
and a consumer encountering the good state will save some income for the
second period. However, the consumer necessarily faces some income risk in
the second period, and hence optimally stops short of equalizing ¯rst-period
expenditures in the good state and the bad state, incurring some risk in the
¯rst period in order to smooth the extreme values of the risky second-period
income. Borrowing and saving mitigate the risk faced by the consumer, but
do not eliminate it.
Once again, layo®s allow the ¯rm to relax the marginal product con-
straint on the relatively low state-2 wage. Section 6 proves:
Proposition 2 For su±ciently small ¯ > 0, there exist ¹ ·(¯) > 0, ¹ °(¯) > 0;
¹ ³(¯) and ¹ Ã(¯) such that for all · < ¹ ·(¯); ° < ¹ °(¯), ³ > ¹ ³(¯) and Ã > ¹ Ã(¯),
the optimal contract features layo®s.
Remark 4. Our model has only two states and two consumption tech-
nologies to allow us to highlight most clearly the relationship between con-
sumption commitments and the optimality of layo®s. Expanding the model
21beyond two periods requires additional notation, but doesn't alter the qual-
itative character of our results. Our assumptions that there are only two
states and only two consumption technologies make for rather stark equi-
libria. In the contracts of interest, those una®ected by layo® risks make
commitments. Those at risk either make no commitments (in the single-
period model) or possibly (in the multiperiod model) make a commitment
involving the same ¯xed cost, though not necessarily the same level of ser-
vice, as those not at risk. A richer model would allow for shocks of varying
sizes and a variety of commitment technologies featuring di®erent trade-o®s
between ¯xed and marginal costs, along with many periods. Workers at
various stages of their tenure with the ¯rm would face di®erent layo® risks
and make commitments of di®erent types and sizes. Optimal employment
contracts in such models are shaped by the same forces as in our simpler
analysis, but with considerably more complicated details.
5 Discussion
Endogenous risk aversion. Consumers who make consumption commit-
ments in our model behave is if they are risk averse over small variations in
income, despite their linearly homogeneous utility functions. More generally,
the utility functions we can hope to observe are inferred from behavior that
is the product of an interaction between preferences and the technology for
converting income into consumption. Di®erent technologies may lead us to
di®erent and potentially misleading inferences concerning risk aversion. For
example, we may infer from consumers' behavior that they are risk neutral,
concluding that insurance has no value, while the opening of an insurance
market may give rise to both risk-averse behavior and active demand for
insurance.14
Concentrated risks. Conditional on facing a risk of being laid o®, the
worker would prefer to concentrate this risk in as few states as possible. In
essence, there are economies of scale in bearing risk, inducing workers to
lump risks together rather than disperse them.
Habit formation. Our model generates behavior that is similar to that
of many habit formation models.15 Attanasio [2] discusses a typical habit
14Chetty [7] also makes this point.
15See Deaton [10] and Attanasio [2] for surveys of the habit formation literature and
Chetty and Szeidl [9] for an examination of the connection between consumption commit-
22formation model which in essence decreases an individual's e®ective current
consumption by a constant times the individual's depreciated aggregate pre-
vious consumption, making the individual averse to downward adjustments
in consumption. If the force of habit formation is strong enough, it could
lead to optimal employment contracts that include layo®s in a manner sim-
ilar to that shown in this paper.16
Morale. Bewley [5, 6] discusses the tendency of employers to insure wage
but not layo® risk, in order to avoid detrimental morale e®ects that espe-
cially accompany wage reductions. This di®erential e®ect on morale is in
turn traced to a convention that wage reductions (but not layo®s) are a vio-
lation of fairness or social norms. We agree that adverse morale e®ects may
pose signi¯cant barriers to wage reductions. But why are wage reductions
devastating for morale, reductions in overtime for hourly employees less so,
and appropriately conducted layo®s less so? One possibility is that morale
e®ects reinforce employment practices that are customary, with these prac-
tices having become customary because they have economic advantageous
linked to their interaction with consumption commitments.17
6 Appendix: Details of Proofs
Lemma 1.1. Suppose that the consumer sets ^ y = 0. Then the consumer
is risk neutral and the consumer's indirect utility function can be written
as pw1 + (1 ¡ p) n2
n1+n2w2. Attaching multiplier ¸ to the consumer's par-
ticipation constraint and multiplier ¹ to the constraint that n1 ¸ 0 (one
easily veri¯es that workers will not optimally be laid o® in the good state),
while ignoring the constraint that wages not exceed marginal products, the
¯rst-order conditions for the ¯rm's pro¯t maximization problem are:
n1 : p(®f0(n1 + n2) ¡ w1) ¡ ¸(1 ¡ p)
n2w2
(n1 + n2)2 + ¹ = 0 (4)
ments and habit formation.
16The models of consumption commitments and habit formation exhibit some di®er-
ences. For example, our model would suggest nontrivial heterogeneity, linked to ob-
servable characteristics, across individuals in their aversion to downward adjustments in
consumption|an individual who has made consumption commitments will be more averse
to income shocks than an individual who has avoided commitments.
17Bewley [5, Chapter 13] explains that layo®s have the advantage of focussing adverse
e®ects on those who are no longer with the ¯rm, but also that they have morale e®ects for
the entire workforce that are small compared to those of wage reductions (Chapter 11).
23n2 : p(®f0(n1 + n2) ¡ w1) + (1 ¡ p)(f0(n2) ¡ w2) + ¸(1¡p)
n1w2
(n1 + n2)2 = 0(5)
w1 : ¡p(n1 + n2) + ¸p = 0 (6)




Assume that n1 > 0, so that there are layo®s, and hence ¹ = 0. Coupling
this with the equality ¸ = n1 + n2, which we can derive from either of (6)
or (7), we can rewrite (4){(5) as
















or f0(n2) = 0, a contradiction. Hence, there must be no layo®s. We can
also conclude, from (5) and the constraint that wages not exceed marginal
products, that w1 = ®f0(n2) and w2 = f0(n2) which in turn implies that
w1 > w2.
Lemma 3. We proceed quickly through some obvious cases. If both wages
fall short of the corresponding marginal products, then the ¯rm could in-
crease pro¯ts by hiring more labor at the existing wage rate while preserving
the existing probability of a layo® (and hence preserving worker utility). If
w1 equals its marginal product and w2 falls short of its marginal product,
then either (1) w2 < w1, in which case the ¯rm can increase w2 and de-
crease w1, preserving expected wage payments while preserving or increasing
worker utility and leading to a state at which both wages fall short of their
marginal products (at which point the ¯rm can increase pro¯ts by hiring
more labor); or (2) w2 ¸ w1, in which case there must be layo®s in the bad
state and the ¯rm can increase pro¯ts and consumer utility by hiring more
labor in the bad state (and hence reducing the layo® probability). Hence, we
must have w2 = f0. If w2 > w1, then either smoothing wages (if w1 < ®f0)
or reducing n1 (if w1 = ®f0) again increases consumer utility while preserv-
ing the ¯rm's payo®, allowing the ¯rm to exploit the resulting slack in the
participation constraint to increase pro¯ts. Thus, we must have:
®f0 ¸ w1 ¸ w2 = f0: (8)









pw1 ¸ ¹ U;
where ~ Ui(w1;w2) is the indirect utility function identifying the consumer's
utility when state i is realized, when not vulnerable for layo®s and given
wages w1 and w2. Notice that in the presence of commitments, both wages
are relevant for determining state-i utility and ~ Ui is in general not linear.
Attaching multiplier ¸ to the participation constraint, ´ to the constraint
f0 ¡ w2 ¸ 0, and ¹ to the constraint n1 ¸ 0, the ¯rst-order conditions for
the ¯rm's pro¯t maximization problem are:
n1 : p(®f0(n1 + n2) ¡ w1) ¡ ¸
n2
(n1 + n2)2(p~ U1 + (1 ¡ p)~ U2)
+¸p
n2
(n1 + n2)2w1 + ¹ = 0 (9)
n2 : p(®f0(n1 + n2) ¡ w1) + (1 ¡ p)(f0(n2) ¡ w2)
+¸
n1
(n1 + n2)2(p~ U1 + (1 ¡ p)~ U2) ¡ ¸p
n1
(n1 + n2)2w1 + ´f00(n2) = 0 (10)


























¡ ´ = 0: (12)
Now suppose ¯rst that there are no layo®s, so that n1 = 0. Then (10)
becomes:
p(®f0(n2) ¡ w1) + (1 ¡ p)(f0(n2) ¡ w2) + ´f00(n2) = 0: (13)
Now suppose that both wages equal marginal products. Then (13) can be


























dw1 + (1 ¡ p)d~ U2
dw1
pd~ U1



















where ~ U(w1;w2) = p~ U1(w1;w2) + (1 ¡ p)~ U2(w1;w2) gives expected utility
conditional on not being at risk of being laid o®, u is the consumer's direct
utility function (1), (x¤
i;y¤
i ) is the optimal consumption bundle in state i,
and the ¯nal equality follows from an envelope argument. The outer two








2 , yield a
contradiction.
Now suppose that the optimal employment contract features layo®s in
state 2. (It is straightforward to exclude the optimality of layo®s in state
1.) Suppose the ¯rst weak inequality in (8) is an equality. Since n1 > 0, we
have ¹ = 0. From (9), we then have
¡¸
n2
(n1 + n2)2(p~ U1 + (1 ¡ p)~ U2) + ¸p
n2
(n1 + n2)2w1 = 0:
As a result, we have pw1 = p~ U1 + (1 ¡ p)~ U2. This is a contradiction. The
maximum utility achieved when making no consumption commitments and
faced with wages w1 in state 1 and 0 in state 2 is pw1. A consumer who
has income w2 > 0 in state 2 and makes no commitments must then re-
ceive a higher utility, and a consumer with income w2 who optimally makes
commitments must receive a utility at least as high as the latter, giving the
contradiction. Hence, we must have ®f0 > w1 ¸ w2 = f0.
Proposition 2. We assume that the optimal contract features no layo®s
and seek a contradiction. The optimal no-layo® contract must then feature
N = n2, n1 = 0, and ®f0(n2) > w1 ¸ w2 = f0(n2). The ¯rm's pro¯ts are in
general given by,
p[®f(n1 + n2) ¡ w1(n1 + n2)] + (1 ¡ p)[f(n2) ¡ w2n2];
where the assumption that there are no layo®s currently gives n1 = 0. Be-
ginning with the optimal no-layo® contract, we consider an adjustment that
decreases n2, adjusting w2 so as to preserve equality with the marginal prod-
uct of labor in the bad state (i.e., dw2=dn2 = f00(n2)), increasing w1 similarly,
and adjusting n1 so as to preserve expected pro¯ts. It is a contradiction to
show that this adjustment increases consumer utility.
26We di®erentiate with respect to n2, giving:
p
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Because f0(n2) = w2, dw1=dn2 = dw2=dn2 = f00(n2), and n1 = 0 by as-




p[®f0(n2) ¡ w1] ¡ f00(n2)n2
p[®f0(n2) ¡ w1]
: (15)
Let ~ U(w1;w2) be the indirect utility function, giving expected utility as
a function of the wages w1 and w2, conditional on not being at risk of a
layo®. This indirect utility is of the form
~ U(w1;w2) = p(~ U11(w1;w2) + ±(p~ U21(w1;w2;1) + (1 ¡ p)~ U22(w1;w2;1)))
+ (1 ¡ p)(~ U12(w1;w2) + ±(p~ U21(w1;w2;2) + (1 ¡ p)~ U22(w1;w2;2)));
where ~ U11(w1;w2) is the ¯rst-period utility given the good state (with ~ U12(w1;w2)
in the case of the bad state) and ~ U21(w1;w2;1) (for example) is the second-
period utility, given that the good state is realized in the second period (the
second subscript) and given that the good state was also realized in the
¯rst period (the argument 1 in the function). The latter is relevant because
the ¯rst-period state determines how much the consumer borrows or saves,
and hence second-period (state-contingent) income. Let ~ V similarly be the
indirect utility function for a consumer at risk of layo® in the ¯rst period
(only). This function takes a similar form, but di®ers from ~ U in recognition























































































































or, using the fact that the consumer's expected utility ~ U(w1;w2) must equal
























Now ¯x ¯ and · su±ciently small that the consumer makes commitments,
and hold ¯ ¯xed while letting · decrease. As · and ° get small, U=f0(n2) is
bounded (because the ¯rm optimally sets f0(n2) ¸ ¯, to ensure the feasibility
of consumption commitments) while d~ U
dw1 + d~ U
dw2 approaches in¯nity (because
small · allows increases in w2 to yield ever larger increases in ^ y, the marginal
utility of which remain large as ° gets small). Noting that µ is by assumption
bounded away from zero, the inequality (and contradiction) thus holds if
® ¡ w1=f0(n2) is positive and bounded away from zero. It is positive by
(the counterpart for the two-period model of) Lemma 3. We then note that
w1=f0(n2) approaches one, for ¯xed ¯ and ·, as ° gets small and ³ and Ã
get large, since in the limit increments in the state-1 wage are worthless.
We then need only set ° su±ciently small and ³ and Ã su±ciently large.18
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